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1. Introduction
This paper deals with the tests of theories about the exploitation of exhaustible
natural resources. Hotelling’s rule constitutes a central element in these theories. It
is a condition that must be satisfied in order for resource extraction to be dynam-
ically efficient. It is derived under assumptions with respect to technology, price
expectations, interest rates expectations, and market structure. The Hotelling rule,
if actually applicable, might give some insight in the scarcity of the exhaustible
resource under study because it has implications for the in situ price of the resource.
Also, the rule could be used to derive statements about the evolution of market
prices for the raw material from the exhaustible resource. For these reasons it is
important to test for the rule. In this essay no attention will be paid to scarcity
measures derived from so-called biophysical models (see e.g., Cleveland and Stern
1998).
Actually, many tests have already been performed in the past, but, as I hope to
make clear, there is still room for fruitful and important research. In particular it
will be argued that recently there have emerged new theoretical insights regarding
optimal exploitation under full competition as well as under alternative market
conditions which might give rise to alternative approaches to the questions posed.
In Section 2 we shall deal with competitive markets for the extracted commodity.
Section 3 is goes into the so-called cartel-versus-fringe model. Section 4 concludes.
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2. Competitive Depletion
2.1. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL
We consider a single firm that exploits a deposit of a non-renewable resource (S)
and sells the raw material (E) on a competitive market. It is worth stressing that
this involves already several assumptions: the firm has to deal only with one deposit
and does not need to decide on the optimal order of exploitation of deposits, the
firm is not processing the raw material itself and the output market is competitive.
The firm chooses an extraction path so as to maximize total discounted profits
over time. The present interest rate (r) is given to the firm, which has fixed expec-
tations with respect to the future time-path of the interest rate. This also holds for
the market price (p) of the raw material. The extraction costs (c) depend on the
rate of extraction, the stock of the exhaustible resource and time can be included as
a parameter in order to capture the possibility of technical progress. For the time
being we abstract from exploration.
Mathematically, the problem facing the firm can be written as follows.
max
Z 1
0
.t/Tp.t/E.t/− c.E.t/; S.t/; t//Udt
subject to
S0.t/ D −E.t/;E.t/ > 0; S.t/ > 0; S.0/ D S0; given
where
.t/ VD e−
R t
0 r. /d
is the discount factor and S0 denotes the time derivative of the resource stock. It is
assumed that the cost function is differentiable with @c=@E > 0 and @c=@S 6 0.
So the extraction costs are increasing in the rate of extraction and non-increasing
in the stock, which seems a plausible assumption. The optimal extraction model
given here is quite general and captures many models found in the literature.
The Hamiltonian of the problem, in present value terms, reads
H.E; S; t; / D .t/Tp.t/E − c.E; S; t/U − E:
The necessary conditions for optimality require a.o. that there exists a function 
the present shadow price of the resource stock, such that for all t > 0
@H.E.t/; S.t/; t; .t//=@E.t/ D 0; if E.t/ > 0
−0.t/ D @H.E.t/; S.t/; t; .t//=@S.t/:
Hence:
.t/Tp.t/− @c=@EU D .t/ (1)
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−0.t/ D .t/@c=@S (2)
Equation (2) is most easily understood after writing it in integral form:
.0/ D .t/Tp.t/− @c=@EU C
Z t
0
.s/@c=@Sds:
Suppose the extractor buys an additional marginal unit of the resource at the outset
of the planning period. The left-hand side denotes the cost of acquiring it. The
additional amount is mined at t . The first term on the right-hand side gives the
additional discounted profits of selling the unit. The second term is the total dis-
counted additional profits up to t caused by the fact that the resource contained
more ore before t and hence was more easily depleted.
The simplest case occurs if extraction costs are absent. Then it follows from
Equation (2) that the present value shadow price of the resource stock is constant,
implying from Equation (1) that the market price of the raw material rises at a
rate equal to the interest rate. This is the Hotelling rule in its rudimentary form,
which can also be stated by saying that the current price of the in situ reserves
( .t/ VD .t/=.t/) increases at the rate of interest.
If the extraction costs do not depend on the resource stock and marginal extrac-
tion costs do not depend on the rate of extraction nor on time .c.E; S; t/  E,
with  a positive constant) then the present value shadow price of the exhaustible
resource is constant and marginal revenues of selling the raw material increase
over time at a rate equal to the rate of interest. The current price of in situ reserves
increases at the same rate. Moreover, since  is constant and since total extraction
over time equals the given initial stock, it readily follows that total discounted
profits equal
Z 1
0
.t/Tp.t/− UE.t/dt D S0 D Tp.0/− US0: (3)
The more general case is studied by Farzin (1992 and 1995) who assumes that basi-
cally the resource base is infinite but that the extraction costs become prohibitively
high when the accumulated extraction goes to infinity. One way to model this is to
assume that, for any t , p.t/−c.E; S; t/ < 0 as S becomes smaller than some given
value (independent of t). Farzin shows that, under plausible assumptions, the cur-
rent value shadow price converges to a constant as time goes to infinity, but might
be monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing or might not be monotone.
Hence the time path of the price of the in situ reserves crucially depends on the
specification of the cost function and there is no reason a priori to suppose that
resource rents are increasing. These observations have far-reaching consequences
for testing the Hotelling rule. Indeed the rudimentary Hotelling rule could easily
be refuted despite the fact that the underlying richer theory is applicable.
Some authors use a slightly different model to test for the Hotelling rule. They
assume that the extracted commodity (E) needs to be processed in order to get a
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final product (Z) that can be sold on a market at a price p. Let the production cost
be denoted by the cost function c.E;Z; S; t/, which is the minimal cost to produce
Z, given the amount extracted E, the remaining stock S and time (allowing for
exogenous technical progress). Assuming an interior solution we have among the
necessary conditions
p.t/ D @c=@Z
.t/ D −.t/@c=@E
0.t/ D .t/@c=@S:
The second condition is the static efficiency condition and the third one is a
condition for dynamic efficiency, which is the Hotelling rule.
Before turning to the empirical issues a few remarks are in order.
First, it should be noted that the assumption that extraction costs increase as the
stock decreases might be plausible for a single well, but that it is by no means the
case that costs will be smaller the larger is the total stock available. If we allow
for exploration it might be the case that a new well turns out to be more costly
to exploit than existing ones. See on this issue Toman and Walls (1995), Livernois
and Uhler (1987) and Swierzbisky and Mendelsohn (1989). These observations are
very important in relation to the empirical work discussed below, because it often
rests on aggregated data. As a first recommendation for further research I therefore
cite Toman and Walls (o.c., p. 186): “. . . considerable further work is needed to
understand the microfoundations of the industry cost function.” Some authors, e.g.,
Slade and Thille (1997) and Chermak and Patrick (1997), begin to do so, using data
that are as much disaggregated as possible.
Second, in the model exploration has not been taken into account. For an early
study on this issue, including a discussion of the resulting time path of the shadow
price, the reader is referred to a model by Long (1977), where labour can be
employed to search for new deposits. In this particular model the growth rate of the
shadow price still equals the interest rate. This will alter if there is a relationship
between the existing resource stock and the effect of exploration activities.
Third, it is appropriate to address the issue of scarcity. Suppose the assumptions
made in the theory, with regard to perfect foresight and competitive markets, hold
in reality. Moreover assume that no new (unexpected) discoveries are made and
that there is no technical progress. Then the shadow price of the resource is an
appropriate measure of scarcity of the resource, if this is defined as the marginal
contribution to welfare. However, it is highly unlikely that the assumptions are
satisfied in reality. For example, Norgaard (1990) argues that there are problems
with regard to the information available to the resource owners. Norgaard (o.c.)
even puts forward that in the case of imperfect information scarcity tests are based
on a logical fallacy, because the price paths on the basis of which statements are
made about scarcity may only reflect the ignorance of the decision makers. Based
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on this critique and the fact that other assumptions of the theory may not hold, one
should be very careful with regard to the interpretation of the empirical results.
2.2. EMPIRICAL TESTING
There are several ways to test for the Hotelling rule, depending among other things
on the formulation that is deemed applicable.
(A). In the case of constant marginal extraction costs () one can apply Equation
(3), provided data are available on property values, resource stocks and marginal
profitability. Miller and Upton (1985) employed data on U.S. gas and oil companies
in a cross section study. The equation estimated is:
V it0
Sit0
D 0 C 1Tpit0 − it0 U
where V denotes the value of the property, the index i refers to the firm and 0 refers
to the at t current values. The Hotelling rule holds if 0 D 0 and 1 D 1. Miller
and Upton (o.c.) find support for this hypothesis. However, Adelman (1990) argues
that this approach overvalues the resources, because of the neglect of develoment
costs, which in Adelman’s view are crucial.
(B). If the requirements with respect to data on the in situ price are not satisfied, one
needs to use a proxy. An approach frequently followed is to postulate a functional
form for the cost function (for example translog or generalized Cobb-Douglas) and
to estimate the parameters. Subsequently a test is performed to see if the shadow
price , derived from the static efficiency condition, satisfies the Hotelling rule. In
order to do so assumptions need to be made concerning the price expectations and
the interest rate.Then there are three crucial elements in such a test of the Hotelling
principle: the functional form, the formation of output price expectations and the
appropriate interest rate. We shall briefly review the literature in order to see where
the main challenges for future research lie. The survey also gives an impression
of the resource markets that have been subject to research. We start by discussing
papers where price expectations are implicit in the information available on actual
behaviour.
– Chermak and Patrick (1995 and 1997) study the market for natural gas in
the U.S. using monthly data from 29 tight gas sand wells. They employ a
generalized Cobb-Douglas cost function, giving monthly costs as a function
of gas produced, remaining reserves and a time trend. They also allow for
cost differences between firms. They find that the Hotelling rule cannot be
rejected for high interest rates, which, as they argue, might be applicable to
the firms under consideration. For further research they suggest to incorporate
uncertainty into the firm’s decision problem.
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– Halvorsen and Smith (1984 and 1991) study the Canadian metal mining indus-
try on an aggregate level and use a generalized Cobb-Douglas cost function
as well. They strongly reject the theory. They suggest further research on
disaggregated data and uncertainty in a world of imperfect arbitrage.
– Pesaran (1990) deals with oil exploration and exploitation on the U.K. con-
tinental shelf. With respect to the formation of price expectations Pesaran
considers several alternatives such as rational expectations and adaptive expec-
tations. He finds that adaptive price formation is getting more support from the
data than rational expectations. See also Hanley et al. (1997) for a discussion
of Pesaran’s work.
(C). There are quite a few studies that do not derive the (implicit) in situ price of
the resource from a cost function. They infer the in situ price from the evolution
of the price of the extracted commodity. The idea is that increasing prices together
with non-increasing marginal costs indicate that the current resource price itself
should be increasing. The seminal work in this area is without any doubt done by
Barnett and Morse (1963) who found that mineral prices (fuels, metal, nonmetals)
show a horizontal trend over the period 1870–1957 and conclude that the scarcity
hypothesis fails (Barnett and Morse (o.c.), p. 211). Smith (1979) considers basi-
cally the same data starting at 1900 and extending the sample period to 1973. He
concludes that for minerals one could detect an increasing trend over the final part
of the period under investigation, but also that “evaluations of resource scarcity
. . . do not seem possible” (Smith (o.c.), p. 426). Slade (1982) finds that price series
for a large number of nonrenewable resources display a U-shaped form over the
period of investigation (1870–1978). However, in a later paper Slade (1991) shows
that prices have been very volatile after the sample period, which finding does
not provide evidence for a sustained trend. Berck (1995) remarks that this strand
of the literature exhibits some weaknesses. First, referring to Slade (1982), the
parameters of the model are not constant over time: they change as estimates are
made for subperiods. Moreover, the price series might not be stationary around
a deterministic trend, but around a stochastic trend. This issue is addressed in a
recent paper by Ahrens and Sharma (1997).
Intermezzo
A time series is called stationary if its mean, variance and covariances are
constant over time. A non-stationary time series may exhibit a deterministic
trend or a stochastic trend. The former can be made into a stationary time
series (trend stationary) by appropriate detrending. Processes which, after a
random shock, do not return to the trend or the mean, are called stochastic
trend processes or unit root processes. The econometric literature provides
several tests for unit roots. See e.g., Stewart (1991). The importance of this
approach lies in the fact that the assumption of trend stationarity (made e.g.,
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by Slade (1982)) may lead to wrong conclusions using conventional regression
techniques, when the real underlying process exhibits a stochastic trend.
Slade (1988) performed the first test for unit roots in the Hotelling model. She
finds that the prices of six out of the seven commodities (copper, iron, lead, bauxite,
silver, petroleum, coal) under study exhibit a random walk. Her work was extended
by Abgeyegbe (1993), who finds that three out of four resource prices can be
characterized as unit root processes. Ahrens and Sharma (o.c.) employ ARMA
and ARIMA (with lag lengths of 6 years) forms to describe trend stationarity and
difference stationarity respectively. And they use several procedures to test for unit
roots. In their sample of 11 resource commodities (aluminum, bituminous coal,
copper, iron, lead, natural gas, nickel, petroleum, silver, tin and zinc) they con-
clude for six resource commodities that the price is generated by trend stationary
processes. This is contrary to what Slade (o.c.) and Agbeyegbe (o.c.) found. As the
next step the authors suggest that more general ARMA models are used to study
the long run behavior of prices. We also refer to Berck and Roberts (1996) who
depart from a very general model and find no evidence for rising prices. It should
be worthwhile to investigate further the issue of unit roots in resource prices.
(D). The fourth approach rests on the idea that the resource is an asset and its price
should satisfy the usual equilibrium conditions on the asset markets. The theory
is as follows. Suppose that the extraction technology or the competitive market
price of the extracted commodity is subject to uncertainty. Then the stock of the
exhaustible resource is a risky asset. If there are other risky assets in the economy
this implies that the rate of return on the exhaustible resource (after correction for
inflation and taxes) is a convex combination of the risk free rate of return and the
return on the market portfolio. No other variables are needed to explain the rate of
return on the exhaustible resource. Berck (1995) clearly points out that it is very
important to note that this presupposes knowledge about the actual rate of return
on the market portfolio, which is not known at the moment the decision is taken.
Moreover, other types of arbitrage equations are possible as well.
An application can be found in Slade and Thille (1997). They first derive the
so-called Hotelling/Capital Asset Pricing Model, giving the following equation:
0= D r C @c=@S

C .rm − r/
where  is the current value in situ price, identified with marginal profits .p −
@c=@E/, rm is the rate of return on the market portfolio and r is the risk free rate
of return. This model is applied to Canadian copper mines. For the rate of return
on the market portfolio is taken the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index, and for the
risk free interest rate is taken a Canadian bond rate. The analysis of the data does
not reject the model, although the authors are very cautious, since the estimated 
coefficient is deemed very high. In an earlier paper, Berck (1995) goes into other
problems that can be encountered in this approach. He puts forward that in general
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the stock market does not obey the rules economic theory “imposes.” Moreover,
predictions of the rate of return on the exhaustible resource should use information
available to the decision makers before the actual decision is made. It is therefore
questionable to use the actual interest rate. It would be preferable to use lagged
interest rates.
Studies that also use the CAPM are Heal and Barrow (1980) and Agbeyegde
(1989). The former authors construct an arbitrage model for copper, lead, tin and
zinc and show that changes in interest rates rather that the interest itself is likely
to determine the resource price. Agbeyegde (o.c.) confirms this empirical result
and underpins this theoretically by arguing that the expected rate of capital gains
on the exhaustible resource should equal the rate of return on other assets, where
expectations are formed on the basis of past rates of return on the exhaustible
resource.
3. Imperfect Competition
One important area of research addresses the question of cartelization and its
effects on prices and profitability. Here it is necessary to make a distinction be-
tween different resource cartels as is done in the comprehensive survey by Teece
et al. (1993), who discuss the oil market and the markets for mercury, uranium
and diamonds, also from an empirical point of view. Here we wish to restrict
ourselves to the oil market. Teece et al. (o.c.) identify three views with respect
to cartelization of this market. First, OPEC acts as a cartel with Saudi Arabia as
leader. Second, as argued by e.g., MacAvoy (1982), the price increases on the oil
market in the seventies were not due to OPEC but to market conditions such as
minimal excess capacity. Third, there is the target revenue model where OPEC
behavior is characterized by budgetary needs of the governments.
The seminal empirical work is done here by Griffin (1985), who finds support
for the cartel point of view in a very simple model of an individual country’s supply,
as a fraction of total OPEC supply. However, these models may not sufficiently
take into account the strategic interactions on the world oil market. These can be
modelled in several ways but one appealing approach is the so-called cartel-versus-
fringe model introduced by Salant (1976). By now there is an abundant theoretical
literature on this issue, which is surveyed elsewhere (see Withagen and De Zeeuw
1998). I therefore restrict myself here to the basic issues and propose to develop
tests of one particular model.
Consider the case where there is one coherent cartel and a large number of
small oil producers (called the fringe). Demand for oil is linear in the price p and
the demand function is constant over time. Denoting supply of the cartel by Ec and
aggregate supply of the fringe by Ef , we have p.t/ D p−Ec.t/−Ef .t/, where p
is the choke price. For simplicity it is assumed that the extraction costs only depend
on the rate of extraction and that marginal extraction costs are constant but differ
among the cartel and the fringe. They are kc and kf respectively. In the case treated
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here we assume that the cartel does have a cost advantage over the fringe but that
the cost advantage is not extremely large. Specifically: kc < kf < 12.p C kc/. The
aggregate fringe acts as a price-taker and maximizes its discounted profits given by
Z 1
0
e−rt Tp.t/− kf UEf .t/dt
subject to
S0f .t/ D −Ef .t/; Ef .t/  0; Sf .t/ > 0:
The interesting part of the modelling concerns the cartel’s behavior.
The first alternative is to assume that the cartel is a price-taker as well. Secondly,
one could attribute some market power to the cartel.
One way to do this is to assume that the cartel sets the market price (as a time-
path), the fringe reacts to that and the cartel takes the fringe’s supply as given. We
will refer to this as the Nash equilibrium. There is a problem here, namely that the
fringe’s reaction is a correspondence rather than a function because the Hotelling
rule makes the fringe reaction indeterminate as long as this rule holds. Nevertheless
the equilibrium can be calculated (see e.g., Ulph and Folie 1980). Some empirical
work on this type of this model has been done by Polasky (1992). He studies the
equilibrium where all agents act as Nash players, in an open loop setting. Also
Pindyck (1978 and 1982) has made an important contribution to this field in the
Nash approach.
One other way to proceed is to assume that the cartel is a von Stackelberg leader
and takes the fringe’s reaction into account in setting the price path. It makes a
major difference how the equilibrium is precisely defined. If the open-loop equi-
librium concept is employed then the phenomenon of dynamic inconsistency may
occur (see Newbery 1981; Groot et al. 1992), which makes the equilibrium con-
cept obsolete, at least in the absence of binding contracts. The better equilibrium
concept is the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium, where time-inconsistency is
ruled out by definition because the strategies of the players depend on the exist-
ing resource stocks. For the particular model at hand the equilibrium has only
recently been calculated by Groot et al. (1997). A similar model with extraction
costs depending on the remaining resource stocks (in such a way that the physical
resources are never depleted) was studied by Karp and Tahvonen (1996). It would
be very challenging to test these theories, because they are more sophisticated
than the very simple model underlying the work by Griffin (o.c.). For the func-
tional forms used above the theory derives explicit expressions for the time paths
of supply by the cartel, the fringe and of the price. So, the theory allows for a
straightforward test.
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4. Conclusions
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows. The testing of
Hotelling’s rule, in any formulation, encounters difficulties. Data on in situ price
are usually not available, and we do not know much about the formation of expec-
tations on the part of the resource suppliers. With respect to the data much work is
to be done in this area. Also information on disaggregated extraction cost functions
would be very welcome. Furthermore I would recommend further research based
on the CAPM model (or extensions like Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Extended
CAPM) for other markets than studied so far, possibly using techniques such as
ARCH or GARCH. However, this does not mean that in the application of these
theories less problems will be encounterted. Finally, there is much room for testing
Hotelling type rules for resource commodities that are traded on non-competitive
markets.
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